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PROGRESS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Robert F. Nagel* 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. By Robin West. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 1994. Pp. 359. $45. 
Most people, naturally enough, have a benign opinion of them-
selves and believe that they would like to see social conditions im-
prove. Oddly, however, few seem especially motivated to contest 
the appropriation of the label "progressive" by some on the polit-
ical left. The concession is not minor. If what these people favor is 
progress, those who disagree with them must favor either stasis in 
an imperfect world or deterioration. For those who, like me, have 
been assigned to the wrong side of the rhetorical divide, this should 
be insulting.1 More important, accepting this label is intellectually 
limiting; it insinuates a presumed answer for a question that ought 
to be the subject of wide-open debate - namely, which direction is 
forward. While Progressive Constitutionalism contains real insights 
for constitutional theory, it does not say enough about the harder 
moral and political questions that must be addressed if there is to 
be any justification for the confident claim made by the book's title. 
* Ira Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1968, 
Swarthmore College; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School. - Ed. The author thanks Paul Campos 
and Steven Smith for helpful comments on this paper. 
1. So strong is the impulse to see "progress" as an essentially uncontestable attribute of 
the political left that academic ideologues will - if necessary - fabricate antagonists who 
are either amazingly ignorant or badly intentioned. For example, Professor Mark Graber 
says that in my political world "opponents of liberal judicial activism can do no wrong." 
Mark A. Graber, Book Review, 12 CONST. COMM. 305, 310 (1995) (reviewing ROBERT F. 
NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER (1994)). He goes on to say that I 
believe "[r]acism ceased to be a political factor in American public life somewhere around 
1960," id., that I think that no reason exists for fearing that the suppression of obscenity 
might result in widespread timidity, and that I am unable to see how so-called informed 
consent laws might interfere with the doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 312. This depiction 
somehow arises from his reading of a book that contains: (1) a long and severe critique of 
the thinking of Robert Bork, as well as a criticism of the effects of judicial restraint generally; 
(2) a discussion of some 1960s segregation strategies that acknowledges Paul Gewirtz's cor-
rective ideal, which arises from "the awful, deliberate wrongs inflicted on black people for so 
long, the brutal sweep of continuity between past deeds and present life," to be "a strong 
animating vision"; (3) a carefully balanced assessment of the reasons one might fear that 
suppression of obscenity could lead to an intellectually sterile environment; and (4) a specific 
statement that informed-consent laws interfere with the therapeutic relationship. See ROB-
ERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER 27-43, 124-40, 119, 89-91, 114 
(1994). 
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I 
There is much that is worthwhile about Professor West's book.2 
It makes some interesting and potentially far-reaching legal argu-
ments. In emphasizing the abolitionist purposes behind the Four-
teenth Amendment, West makes a needed start toward replacing 
rationality analysis with substantive moral claims based in constitu-
tional history. In urging a particular meaning for the word "protec-
tion," she makes a limited but possibly important textual 
argument.3 The book contains strong moralizing about the need for 
"progressive" reforms, and, although these passages are a bit plati-
tudinous for my taste, they are at least forthright and heartfelt.4 
West's proposed interpretations of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses prove useful and interesting,5 even if not entirely 
convincing, but her book's greater significance lies in its jurispru-
dential and institutional analyses. 
As a general rule, one of the most fundamental limitations of 
constitutional scholarship is its myopic fixation on appellate deci-
sions. This fixation, which to some extent is to be expected of law-
yers, is exacerbated by the incestuous relationship between judicial 
clerkships and the professorate and by scholars' short-sighted ideo-
logical opportunism. It distorts historical research, discourages em-
piricism, and diverts attention from realistic social and political 
analysis. More generally, it produces a good deal of tolerance for 
complete nonsense. Progressive Constitutionalism serves as a brac-
ing antidote to all of this. 
West insists that we examine the possibility that judicial inter-
pretations of the Constitution are not merely occasionally or mar-
ginally "incorrect" but consistently and fundamentally inadequate 
from a moral perspective (pp. 118, 192, 282). She traces these inad-
equacies past the usual culprits - Republican judges, racist Fram-
ers, and so on - to the institutional context in which adjudication 
occurs (pp. 48, 89). She argues that this context is inherently con-
servative, constricted, and authoritarian (pp. 192, 282). She is prop-
2. Robin West is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. 
3. West gives little emphasis to the modifier "equal." Cf. Michael W. McConnell, 
Origina/ism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995) (arguing that the 
Framers understood segregation to violate the principle of equality articulated by the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
4. In a typical passage, she argues that progressives favor 
a form of social life in which all individuals live meaningful, autonomous, and self·di-
rected lives, enriched by rewarding work, education, and culture, free of the disabling 
fears of poverty, violence, and coercion, nurtured by life-affirming connections with inti-
mates and co·citizens alike, and strengthened by caring communities that are both atten-
tive to the shared human needs of its members and equally mindful of their diversity and 
differences. 
P. 162. 
5. See pp. 17-18. 
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erly impatient with the obviously improbable but trendy claim that 
the Supreme Court can somehow provide an opportunity for repub-
lican deliberation (p. 283). In short, she helps to open the way for a 
full-scale critical evaluation of our identification of "the Constitu-
tion" with judicial interpretations. 
As a corollary to this critique, West attempts to refocus atten-
tion on the political process as a means of enforcing the Constitu-
tion. In this, of course, she is not alone; modem writers as diverse 
as Louis Fisher, Richard Parker, Edwin Meese, and Paul Brest have 
sounded similar themes.6 West's contribution is distinctive in that, 
although not abandoning traditional sources of meaning like text 
and history, it carries a warning against importing into the political 
arena habits of judicialized discourse (p. 192). It is also specific 
and emphatic in linking political-constitutional interpretation with 
the possibility of an extremely ambitious "progressive" political 
agenda. 
Given the conservative electoral gains that occurred the same 
year this book was published, West's argument that progressives 
should address their constitutional arguments to Congress may now 
seem to have been wildly unrealistic. Even before those gains, 
scholarly disdain for the legislative process, was sufficiently wide-
spread that West shows considerable independence in making this 
argument. Her position cannot be brushed aside on the basis either 
of conventional academic wisdom or episodic shifts in political 
alignment. She points to a record of egalitarian statutory enact-
ments that many legal scholars ignore or take for granted. More-
over, she persuasively argues that, regardless of short-run wins and 
losses, fixation on the judiciary has stunted progressive thought and 
has isolated parts of the Left from the general public. 
West makes valuable substantive contributions, but her book is 
also enjoyable because of the way it combines political and moral 
passion with a degree of intellectual self-doubt and circumspection. 
For example, while in many respects resolutely committed to the 
idea of change-as-progress and, more particularly, to the standard 
"progressive" agenda, West nevertheless resists crude condemna-
tions of American history. She writes that "although no doubt in 
large part a succession of waves of brutality and oppression, [that 
history] may also contain moments of real nobility and courage" (p. 
18). She says, "If we abandon the history and text of the Four-
teenth Amendment ... we may be abandoning a source of moral 
insight ... that is superior to those visions our current ahistoric and 
6. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS A POLITICAL 
PROCESS (1988); RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL 
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. 
L. REV. 979 (1987); see also McConnell, supra note 3. 
1498 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1495 
parochial 'selves' have managed to envision" (p. 18). More gener-
ally, even in urging the development of "a progressive constitu-
tional faith," West admits that the project may be "terribly risky 
because it may very likely be either tamed, co-opted, or, at worst, 
revealed to be in fact ... nothing but the foundation of a new tyr-
anny" (p. 188). 
Thus, just when West's earnest political commitments threaten 
to reduce parts of her book - both intellectually and stylistically 
~ - to a tedious manifesto, she pulls back and provokes critical re-
flection. At its best, Progressive Constitutionalism invites thought 
about the relationship between legal scholarship, political morality, 
and constitutionalism. For me the book prompted some questions 
about what, if anything, constitutional scholars have to contribute 
to general public .debate. Specifically, do we have anything useful 
to say to our fellow citizens about what progress is or how to 
achieve it? 
II 
Viewed as a performance, Professor West's book - as insightful 
as it is for constitutional scholars - casts doubt on whether we 
have much to contribute to political discourse. It does so even in its 
most elementary aspect: Progressive Constitutionalism is addressed 
to law professors, not the general public. 
Indeed, one of the least attractive features of Progressive Con-
stitutionalism is that almost no effort was made to convert its chap-
ters from the unmistakably clanking style of the law review articles 
that they once were. Despite a considerable amount of repetition 
from one chapter to the next, West tells us in each of those chapters 
what she is going to say, then she says it - often laboriously- and 
then she summarizes what she has just said. She makes specialized, 
clumsy references, such as "Sunsteinian" (p. 139). She displays the 
almost quaint otherworldliness that comes from sustained immer-
sion in the insulated hothouse of the legal academy. For instance, 
West declares that "Frank Michelman ... did more than any other 
to popularize the idealistic argument that 'equal protection' re-
quires the states to guarantee a minimum level of welfare" (p. 265). 
These stylistic limitations raise the question of why an author who 
argues that constitutional arguments should be directed at Congress 
would write a book aimed at the world of legal academics. If, as 
West says, "[t]he question is where to invest our energies, how to 
spend our lives" (p. 289), why did she herself not do simply what 
she urges her colleagues to do? 
Of course, Professor West may have been hoping for a kind of 
multiplier effect. Perhaps she concluded that while a book written 
for the political arena might have made for a satisfying life and 
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might even have had some good political consequences, a book 
written to influence professional colleagues might result in other 
books and ultimately more progressive legislation. In striking con-
trast to her more usual stance of insistent intellectualism, in a few 
• places West does take on the guarded tone of a strategizer.7 But 
another, deeper explanation - to use a phrase that West likes -
presents itself. It presents itself because this is an explanation that 
easily could apply to me. It may be that West addresses her writ-
ings primarily to legal scholars because the state of constitutional 
scholarship is such that it is easier to make a contribution there than 
in general political discourse. Or, to put it another way, perhaps 
thinkers who have real insights to offer within the academy never-
theless have very little useful to say to their fellow citizens. The 
academic elite may be using its prodigious resources simply to bat-
tle back - against the tide of professional self-interest and intellec-
tual fashion - to a level of understanding already common among 
the general population. We can explore this possibility by asking 
whether those citizens, including the members of Congress, would 
be especially edified by the sorts of ideas that West uses to edify us 
as law professors. 
Consider West's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
According to her, the abolitionists wanted the Equal Protection 
Clause to ensure that "every individual is equally free of all condi-
tions which could potentially subjugate his will to some sovereign 
power other than the state" (p. 31). The object was to make people 
autonomous by making them free "of other rulers, masters, or 
superiors" (p. 39). West explains the "minimal" principle estab-
lished by this moral attack on slavery as follows: 
[W]e have an absolute, incontrovertible right not to be subject to any 
sovereignty other than the state. From this absolute right [is] derived 
... a right to be free of those conditions which, if unchecked by the 
state, generate separate sovereignties, including, at least, a right to be 
free of private violence and extreme material deprivation. [p. 36] 
Thus the marital rape exception is u11constitutional, as is the failure 
to provide some level of police protection and welfare rights (pp. 
35-37). Moreover, the "current reach" of equal protection might 
include a right to education, abortion, and homosexual marriage (p. 
39). 
7. She says, for instance, that "we might ... profitably reconceptualize the ideal of lib-
erty." P. 140. Later she urges that progressives "emphasize not the Constitution's indetermi-
nacy, but, rather, those constitutional events and ... passages that support the claim [that the 
Constitution is compatible with progressive objectives]." P. 183. She also says, "[o]nly after 
we reinject into constitutional thought and law a self-consciously moral dimension will it 
make sense to call for greater participation by the community in constitutional processes." P. 
192. In imagining constitutional arguments in a political forum, she alludes to the construc-
tion of progressive claims "without too much stretching of the primary materials." P. 303. 
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This position suffers from all the problems that attend those 
magical arguments from "principle" that somehow permit decisions 
that had to do with one set of circumstances to resolve questions 
arising out of strikingly different circumstances. West rather uncrit-
ically relies on Ronald Dworkin's distinction between concepts and 
conceptions as her answer to these problems (p. 31). Nevertheless, 
her "sole-sovereignty principle" should interest constitutional 
scholars because it helps break the intellectual logjam created by a 
fascination with the rationality of legislative classifications that is 
still a significant influence on judges and some academics. 8 It also 
represents an alternative to expansive and historically ungrounded 
claims that equal protection requires full, substantive equality (pp. 
28-29). 
But what could the sole-sovereignty principle add to public de-
bate? The answer is: little, if anything. It is obviously true that 
people cannot and should not be made free of the will of all others 
besides "the state." To begin with, in our federal system there is 
more than one government that is authorized to coerce individuals. 
More important, children are subject to parents, employees to em-
ployers, parishioners to clergy (not to mention God), workers to 
unions, and all of us to the moral pressures that neighbors and the 
broader community create. It adds virtually nothing to public de-
bate to declare that all of these relationships make us, in some mea-
sure, subservient. Everyone knows that, and the hard questions 
that people face have to do with the kinds and degrees of depen-
dence that are necessary or even healthy. If used loosely, as a 
free-floating device to undermine those relationships that progres-
sives dislike, then the sole-sovereignty principle is either a very par-
tial argument or simply unconvincing rhetoric. 
The principle might, however, be used systematically to under-
mine all relationships that impinge on the will of the individual.9 
This version of the principle would, I hope, have no general appeal. 
The twentieth century has presented us with uncontrovertible evi-
dence about the undesirability of the kind of subservience created 
when the only entity authorized to subjugate the will of individuals 
is the state.10 
8. See Robert F. Nagel, Is "Rationality Review" Rational?, 116 PuB. INTEREST 75 (1994); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). 
9. West herself, of course, does not want a homogenized society. For instance, she does 
not argue for governmental repression of religious groups, even those she depicts as oppres-
sive. See p. 114. 
10. On the ideological bases of unitary regimes, see A. JAMES GREGOR, CONTEMPORARY 
RADICAL IDEOLOGIES: TOTALITARIAN THOUGHT IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 318-47 
(1968). On operationalizing unitary rule in a complex industrial society, see Carl J. Friedrich, 
The Failure of a One-Party System: Hitler's Germany, in AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN Moo. 
ERN Soc1ETY: THE DYNAMICS OF ESTABLISHED ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS 239 (Samuel P. Hunt-
ington & Clement H. Moore eds., 1970). 
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Like political zealots, we law professors for some reason tend to 
be fairly tolerant of brave but silly claims like the sole-sovereignty 
principle. But how would it sound if you said to your neighbor or 
your senator, "Every individual should be equally free of all condi-
tions that would potentially subjugate his will to some sovereign 
power other than the state"? Perhaps I am overly optimistic, but I 
believe you would have a hard time getting anyone's attention or, if 
you did, you would not - for good reasons - be taken seriously. 
Moreover, the insights that compensate in the intellectual world of 
legal education would have little power for nonscholars. Ordinary 
people, after all, are not as constrained as are law professors by the 
lure of rationality analysis; nor does the ideal of full, substantive 
equality have much of a following outside the academy. 
This is not to deny that more specific, less intellectualized ver-
sions of the sole-sovereignty principle might be used effectively in 
popular debate. Certainly political arguments that marriage or pov-
erty is like slavery can be and are made. But the power, if any, of 
such claims resides in highly specific comparisons, not in abstract 
and unrealistic assertions about the exclusive sovereignty of the 
state over the will of all citizens. The constitutional principle urged 
in this book would at best lead a legal scholar to the kinds of con-
textualized, and often inflammatory, arguments already in common 
use. 
The sole-sovereignty principl~ is an important part of West's ef-
fort to define "progress," but it amounts to a traditional legal argu-
ment and thus might not necessarily be expected to contribute to 
political discourse in a fully robust way. She makes other, more 
directly moral claims. Indeed, she makes an extensive effort to un-
derstand and convey the progressive impulse. She contends that 
the definitive insight of modem progressive political theory is that 
"conservative deference to communal authority ... directly implies 
a parallel deference to the clusters of social power that invariably 
underlie it" (p. 246). 
Progressivism consists in large measure of "opposition to this 
conservative deference toward social power" (p. 246). In place of 
this deference, "progressives argue [that] state actors should rely on 
the experiences, ideals, and aspirations of the relatively dis-
empowered" (p. 247). As stated, this conception of progressive 
politics is morally empty. Convicted murderers are relatively dis-
empowered, as are American fascists. I am quite certain that West 
does not think that the experiences, ideals, and aspirations of either 
of these groups point the way to a better world. 
Even if relative powerlessness were an index of moral worth, 
West's description of progressivism would not provide any basis for 
political choices. All groups are powerless relative to some other 
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group. Women, for instance, may generally be less powerful than 
men, but they are more powerful than imprisoned felons. More-
over, a group can be either more or less powerful than another 
group depending on the forum; I would suppose that in some state 
legislatures religious conservatives are more powerful than liber-
ated, progressive women but not, I think, before the United States 
Supreme Court. On the other hand, those religious conservatives 
might be more powerful than progressive women even in front of 
the Court if the question involved religious expression in public 
schools rather than the legality of traditional sexual stereotypes. 
This suggests the obvious point that relative power also shifts ac-
cording to the issue. Finally, the relative power of groups can 
change as a consequence of the progressives' own influence. A 
common example occurs when gay-rights groups are successful in 
obtaining the protection of a speech code within a university; the 
effect of this success can be to marginalize heterosexual conserva-
tives.11 When progressives win - an event that West believes oc-
curs more than many academics admit - the very experiences, 
ideals, and aspirations that formed the moral content of the pro-
gressive agenda would immediately become, by definition, the 
power structure against which progressives must fight. In short, 
while sympathy for the underdog is a venerable and understandable 
theme in American politics, it does not provide a serious basis for 
moral decisionmaking. 
While she states her basic definition of progressive politics with-
out embarrassment, West recognizes that it is incomplete. She sup-
plements that definition by importing substantive moral claims into 
her description of the subdivisions of progressive theory. These in-
clude idealistic progressivism, existential progressivism, and an-
tisubordination progressivism. 
The idealist values "memories, glimpses, or dreams" of true 
freedom or equality that arise, not from objective traditions, but 
from "the 'interstices' (as it were) of a daily life" (p. 247). Now, 
"true freedom and equality" does sound like an unassailable de-
scription of the good. But how does the progressive idealist know 
which dreams and glimpses represent "true" freedom and equality? 
West's analysis suggests that idealists believe that visions can be 
counted on to identify the good if they "are not culled from the 
lessons of objective tradition" (p. 247). That is, they are good if 
opposed to the conservative moral impulse. This is surely wrong, 
unless all the conditions and experiences that form the bases of tra-
dition are inevitably bad, a position that West herself wisely rejects 
elsewhere in her book. Some ideological stalwarts on both the left 
11. See Robert F. Nagel, Progressive Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Campus Hate 
Codes, 64 u. Cow. L. REV. 1055 (1993). 
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and right can be counted on to jump to moral conclusions by identi-
fying their opponents' positions and then proposing the opposite; 
however, I doubt that the general public would find much persua-
sive in an unvarnished claim that whatever exists is bad and 
whatever can be imagined is good. 
The problem with the idealist's morality goes beyond the fact 
that some objective traditions are good. As West's use of the word 
"interstices" itself suggests, the very notion that dreams and visions 
can ever stand entirely in opposition to established patterns is 
highly unrealistic. Even Martin Luther King's beautiful speech 
about his dream of racial equality, 12 a speech that West uses to illus-
trate progressive idealism (p. 249), is in fact rooted in some of the 
most traditional American political and religious beliefs, and these, 
in turn, are rooted in life as it has been lived - in the model of 
family life, political participation, and social integration that has 
been imperfectly present in American society from the beginning.13 
There are, needless to say, many powerfully experienced visions 
that are evil and that are rightly distrusted or rejected by most polit-
ical participants. King's vision, in contrast, has been potent pre-
cisely because it is so recognizably a part of our moral traditions. If 
King's dream were actually as visionary as West claims, it would 
have had far less gravity and attractiveness. 
Existential progressives, according to West, identify the good ac-
cording to what promotes "open and identified choice[] and main-
tains a passion for free play, ambiguity, and change" (p. 250). This 
version of progressivism itself arises from the deeply American fas-
cination with personal freedom and flux. If directed at a general 
audience, her discussion would perhaps resonate, but I doubt that it 
would edify. Here, for example, is her description of the existential 
progressive's morality: , 
Tue goal is a social world in which each individual and group is as free 
as possible to "find herself" through discovering her multiple selves; 
to disentrench herself from rigid roles imposed from without ... to 
denaturalize her roots; and to discover her essence not in her essen-
tiality, but in her potentiality. [p. 252] 
12. See Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in WoRDs OF MARTIN LUTHER KING 
95-97 (C.S. King ed., 1983). 
13. Consider this account of King's famous speech: 
King framed this vision entirely within hallowed symbols of Americanism: the Bible, the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the 
"American Dream". The refrain of the patriotic song "My Country 'Tis of Thee" led to 
his peroration . . . . King's perfonnance enraptured the vast assemblage. Even southern 
whites, who could view the proceedings on television, grudgingly praised the dignity of 
the occasion. 
ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 91 (1995). 
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Yes, everyone from Roberto Unger to Newt Gingrich believes in 
discovering his potential, 14 but the cold truth is that change is no 
guarantor of goodness. Although we can try to be many things, the 
question is what it is good to try to be. To write about progress-as-
change does seem to have some unaccountable interest for parts of 
the academy, but as a contribution to wider political discourse it 
would appeal only to the most mindless reflexes of leftist politics 
and to the most banal beliefs that already make up much of our 
general culture. 
For antisubordination progressives, the good is simply an ab-
sence of "constraint, invasion, and bondage" (p. 253). Here West 
writes vividly about "the daily numbing joylessness of a materially 
impoverished existence ... the pain of being a target of hatred and 
abuse ... shackles, chains, whips, bits, and gags" (p. 253). The main 
problem with this litany of bad things is its length. It is, after all, an 
old and transparent trick to start a list with what everyone agrees is 
terrible and then to end it - as if they were just obvious additions 
- with the kinds of doubtful claims that all the real debate was 
about in the first place. Thus, for West subordination includes "the 
restriction on livelihood, social contribution, career, and public 
work brought on even by wanted and celebrated mothering" (p. 
253). If there can be any value for political debate in lumping to-
gether all the career and political costs paid by joyful mothers. -
or, I would add, fathers - with the state of extreme poverty or the 
experience of sexual bondage, I am unable to see what it might be. 
West's enthusiastic discussion of the antisubordination principle 
actually demonstrates not how we might identify progress when 
that is uncertain, but how little guidance we will find in expansive 
analogies amounting to an insistence that certain groups are un-
justly "constrained" unless they have everything they want. Every-
thing is what many Americans already want, and useful writing 
begins from the mature knowledge that politics cannot enable any-
one to escape all the costs that go with choice. West knows this, of 
course; her effort is to pinpoint the special kinds of costs that should 
be considered intolerable in our political system. I suspect, how-
ever, that associating motherhood with whips and gags would not 
seem to ordinary people a plausible way to describe this category. 
III 
Because, as I said at the outset, I am not a progressive, readers 
might well doubt my evaluation of Professor West's efforts to define 
14. West associates Unger with existential progressivism. See p. 268. For an account of 
Gingrich's view on human malleability and the excitement of change, see Joan Didion, The 
Teachings of Speaker Gingrich, N.Y. REV. BooKS, Aug. 10, 1995, at 7 (reviewing Newt Ging-
rich, To Renew America (1995)). 
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"progress." My further claim - that constitutional scholars in gen-
eral probably have little to offer the public on this question -
seems even more likely to arouse skepticism. Whether or not Pro-
gressive Constitutionalism contains moral and political analysis that 
would be useful to the public, many legal scholars have written suc-
cessfully for a wide audience. In recent years, people like Ronald 
Dworkin, Richard Posner, Lani Guinier, and Robert Bork have 
done so,1s and they are part of a long tradition that goes·through 
Alexander Bickel to Zechariah Chafee all the way back to George 
Wythe.16 Obviously, therefore, I do not mean to argue that consti-
tutional scholars are systematically unable to make important con-
tributions to debate about the definition of "progress." What I do 
mean to say is that it is difficult to make such contributions insofar 
as we write as constitutional scholars. The difficulty arises from the 
fact that the "constitutional" component of an argument about pro-
gress is inherently constraining. 
West's book serves as an especially good illustration of this 
point because it goes much further than most constitutional scholar-
ship in recognizing the authoritarian character of constitutional law. 
Presumably to avoid what she criticizes, West's own legal argu-
ments are not designed to be conclusive; in fact, they are openly 
and radically incomplete. Her fundamental position, for example, 
rests on an asserted similarity between slavery and certain modem 
situations such as poverty and abusive marriages, yet she makes no 
effort to develop detailed comparisons. Nor does she attempt to 
analyze whether her abolitionist interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses can be successfully integrated with 
other provisions of the Constitution.17 West, for example, ignores 
federalism and separation of powers. In many respects, then, 
West's arguments seem to take on the following structure: "Here is 
a historical view of the Fourteenth Amendment - and the begin-
nings of an argument about its modem application - that is not the 
whole story but is significant, morally important, and largely over-
looked; I offer this constitutional interpretation not as an authorita-
tive constraint on current decisionmaking but as an avenue for 
moral insight and growth.18 I know that this kind of contribution is 
not fully satisfying as a legal argument; however, given the expecta-
15. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW (1995); LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
16. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmcs (1962); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
(1920); GEORGE WYIHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA, BY THE HIGH COURT OF CHAN-
CERY (1795). 
17. Cf. Philip Bobbitt, Parlor Game, 12 CONST. COMM. 151 (1995). 
18. See, e.g., chapter 8 ("The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law"). 
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tions that judicialized discourse creates, a more complete legal ar-
gument would shut off thought and responsibility in a way that I 
wish to avoid." 
Perhaps this imagined reply to her legalistic critics accurately 
captures one side of West's thought. It is consistent with her argu-
ment against authoritarian judicial decisionmaking and with her call 
for "pragmatic constitutive" arguments. Unfortunately - and curi-
ously - it is not consistent with much of her prose. Recall that her 
"minimal" formulation of the abolitionist meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment insists that "we have an absolute, incontrovert-
ible right not to be subject to any sovereignty other than the state" 
(p. 36; emphasis added). She also argues that the major premise in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services19 -
that the Constitution does not create a right to police protection -
"is squarely wrong" (p. 33). Similarly, West writes that marital rape 
exemptions "do not merely inflict extensive damage on innumera-
ble women's lives, but they also constitute a constitutional outrage" 
(p. 47). In her historical analysis, she moves from relatively careful, 
limited claims ("it is far more consistent with the abolitionist history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to understand [its] liberty . . . in a 
positive rather than negative sense") to broad, definitive conclu-
sions ("the reconstruction amendments ... were intended to ensure 
... the full positive liberty to which slavery is the absolute antithe-
sis") (pp. 125, 126-27). In a single paragraph, West shifts from sug-
gesting that "an abolitionist understanding . . . provides at least 
some support for the claim that the equal protection clause guaran-
tees minimal welfare rights" to asserting that "the state has an obli-
gation to protect citizens from abject subjection to the whims of 
others occasioned by extreme states of poverty" (p. 35). 
West's use of the rhetoric of definitive constitutionalism is not 
inadvertent. In a section titled, "The Latent Possibility of a Pro-
gressive Constitutional Faith," she imagines progressives making 
the claim "that the Constitution really means what the progressive 
insists ... and consequently mandates a progressive conception of 
community" (p. 183). West seems to think that she can reconcile 
her claims about what the Constitution "really means" with her 
hostility to authoritarian interpretation, and her reliance on the ju-
risprudence of Stanley Fish suggests a start in that direction. She 
adopts Fish's view that "some set of purposes, needs, or interests of 
the relevant interpreting community," rather than text or authorial 
intent, establish constitutional meaning (p. 307). Given the empha-
sis that West places on abolitionist history, this seems at least super-
19. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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fi.cially an odd position for her to adopt.20 But Fish's ideas, as 
described by West, do serve her purposes. She notes that if the 
constraints within the interpretive community are sufficiently 
strong, "the text's meaning will be very determined indeed" (p. 
307). Thus, it is possible for a legally incomplete argument to be 
entirely determinate within a nonlegal interpretive community. 
Fish's reader-response theory, in short, helps West move closer to 
two of her basic objectives: to give status to the legislative branch 
as an alternative interpretive community and to frame her legally 
incomplete arguments as constitutionally determinate. 
To accomplish her objectives fully, however, West needs more 
than the abstract jurisprudence of Stanley Fish. First, she needs the 
conventions within the political world to be such that her moral 
analogies and historical arguments, while obviously limited, can be 
definitive before Congress.21 Moreover, even assuming that radi-
cally incomplete legal arguments can lead to determinate conclu-
sions in her preferred forum, West's definitive claims about what 
the Fourteenth Amendment means still must be squared with her 
ideal of "an aspirational Constitution." If, as West argues, false au-
thority in judicial decisionmaking blocks choice about the commu-
nity's purposes and needs, it is no obvious improvement to move to 
a Congress where false authority also is permitted to block choice. 
Although West's answer to these problems is not entirely clear, 
she does say that a constitutional claim, historical or otherwise, will 
seem authoritative if that interpretation converges with the desires 
and interests of a particular polity (p. 310). Thus her argument may 
be (1) that Congress's actual interpretive conventions permit deter-
minative constitutional claims; and (2) that these claims do not 
block choice because they are treated as determinative only when 
they match the moral aspirations of the community. Although one 
can imagine such a set of conventions, West provides no evidence 
that they are in fact the conventions that guide congressional inter-
pretation. Surely members of Congress at least understand and tol-
erate constitutional arguments that are acknowledged to be partial 
and inconclusive. Even if West believes that such carefully phrased 
arguments will nevertheless seem conclusive if they match political 
desires and interests, this would provide no excuse for framing the 
arguments in an exaggerated or inaccurate way. Presumably, it is 
the polity's moral objectives, not bullying modifiers, that should do 
the work of persuasion. Moreover, precisely because in West's view 
20. It also may represent a misunderstanding of Fish, whose later writings emphasize au-
thorial intent. See Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and Law, in LEGAL HERMENEU· 
TICS 297, 299-310 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). 
21. If West is arguing that Fish's position means that interpretive communities can choose 
their conventions, she seems far removed from what Fish thinks. See id. at 299. 
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the underlying issue for political interpretation is how a commu-
nity's desires and interests should be understood, it would seem 
crucial that falsely conclusive legal claims should not cut off choice 
on these matters. At one point, West herself says that Congress 
should not look to the Constitution for "authoritative guidance 
from ... any aspect of our shared past" (p. 312). This points to the 
general conclusion that, just as false authority constricts in judicial 
decisionmaking, it is also authoritarian in political settings. 
West could have confined herself to making precisely qualified 
claims about historical and textual meaning. She could have but-
tressed these claims with direct moral appeals about how the 
desires and interests of the political community should be under-
stood. Why, then, did she not drop the vestiges of legal authoritari-
anism? The blunt answer, I think, is that West does not want 
Congress to engage in full debate about what progress might be. 
Instead, she thinks the "congressional Constitution" should be an 
"avowedly utopian assessment of where we might go" (p. 312). 
That is, definitive claims about history and morality will have a 
place in congressional debate if they are definitive progressive 
claims. West is proposing that the legal academy attempt to con-
vince Congress that the Constitution "mandates" a progressive defi-
nition of community (pp. 183, 305). 
She cannot expect to do this, as I have tried to show in the pre-
ceding section, by relying on those thin understandings of moral 
choice that she calls "progressive." So at the end of her book, West 
attempts to construct an artificial set of interpretive conventions for 
Congress. She declares that the central mission of Congress, unlike 
the courts, is the "alteration, the deviation, and the transformation 
- not the conservation - of the past" (p. 313). In short, an "inter-
pretive community freed of the judicial purpose" would be progres-
sive by definition. It "very likely - even naturally" would 
interpret the Constitution "as requiring, not simply permitting . . . 
far more progressive ... interpretations ... than those reached by 
the Court" (p. 315). Of course it would; if Congress's job is to insti-
tute "progressive" change, then Congress will have to conclude that 
the Constitution requires "progressive" change. 
The trouble with this definition, obviously, is that neither 
change nor "progressive" change is necessarily the function of the 
legislative branch. Every time a bill is defeated or limited, the legis-
lature makes a determination about what not to change. Every 
time a possible bill fails to materialize, the legislature makes a de-
termination that the present seems acceptable or even desirable. 
While these determinations are not always formal acts of legisla-
May 1996] Fourteenth Amendment 1509 
tion, they are important aspects of the legislative process.22 They 
certainly demonstrate that part of the function of the Congress is to 
decide what not to change. Moreover, it goes without saying that 
even when Congress does act, it remains entirely free to move in a 
direction that does not seem utopian to those who call themselves 
progressives. . 
In the end then, "progressive constitutionalism" is authoritarian. 
West's aspirational constitution, like the ideological label used in 
the title of the book, represents an attempt to shut off, full debate 
on what we should do about our future. It privileges a particular 
direction not only as "progressive" but as "constitutional." It pre-
tends that one vision of the future is mandated. If enough law 
professors insist in one way or another that the interpretive canons 
of Congress require it to pursue the progressives' agenda, perhaps 
some politicians will even fall for it. 
Robin West's book demonstrates how - like moths to the 
flame - even impressively insightful constitutional scholars cannot 
resist the bright hope of false authority. The nature of constitu-
tional argument in our system is authoritarian because for us a con-
stitution is a privileged set of positions. Therefore, constitutional 
argument used to direct change is inherently stifling. The only ways 
to avoid this sad end are to give up on the word "constitutional" as 
it has come to be used or to give up on participation in public de-
bate about what progress means. Of course, these alternatives 
would allow for the scholarly study of the Constitution but not for 
policy prescriptions in its name. This would require constitutional 
scholars to come down to the same ground that the rest of the polit-
ical community occupies. In discussions about the future, our 
strong beliefs and hopes would have no rhetorical advantage. They 
would have to be understandable and convincing on their own 
terms. Now, that would be a difficult book to write. 
22. For a more general discussion on the significance of inaction, see NAGEL, supra note 
1, at 151-54. 
